

## **The Statement of acting Chairman of SNRIU Oleh KORIKOV at the visit of DG IAEA Rafael Mariano GROSSY to ChNPP on 26 April 2022**

Dear Mr Grossy, seniors representatives of IAEA,

We welcome you, IAEA officials and experts with IAEA Mission on the ChNPP site and in the Exclusion Zone territory.

The military invasion of russian federation to Ukraine is still ongoing. It is difficult time for our country which bravely fights with aggressive russian armed forces, defending our independence, freedom and democracy.

As it is defined in the UN General Assembly resolutions of 2 March 2022 ES-11/1 **"Aggression against Ukraine"**, **Ukraine has been under a full-scale armed aggression launched by the russian federation.**

In 2009, in its Resolution, the IAEA General Conference took a decision that **“any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”**.

Ukraine is one of the ten largest countries in the world in terms of nuclear energy use.

We should admit that there are no analogues worldwide of the nowadays situation in Ukraine. There have not been full scale military aggression in countries with the same number of nuclear installations as in Ukraine - nuclear facilities (15 (fifteen) nuclear power units on the 4 (four) NPP sites), Chornobyl NPP under decommissioning, New Safe Confinement, spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, nuclear research facilities in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sevastopol, a number of radioactive waste management facilities, more than 26 thousand of ionizing radiation sources in use.

As a country that has already paid a very high price for the Chornobyl disaster, Ukraine has been applying significant permanent efforts for decades to ensure the highest standards of nuclear and radiation safety and security. The results of those efforts are confirmed by the conclusions of many international missions, peer reviews, cooperation projects.

However, the conditions of the high safety standards of peaceful atom use have changed dramatically as a result of russian federation's full-scale military aggression against Ukraine.

Ignoring the internationally recognized security principles and requirements, as well as the international obligations of the Russian Federation itself, as a member

of the United Nations and the IAEA, the Russian military forces committed cynical and brutal invasions and further seizures of:

- the Exclusion Zone territory and the Chernobyl NPP site on 24<sup>th</sup> February 2022 which lasted for more than a month;
- Enerhodar city on 3 March 2022, and Zaporizhzhya NPP industrial site where 7 nuclear installations are located, on the night of 4 March 2022 which still ongoing.

The nuclear research facility “Neutron Source” in Kharkiv which is loaded with 37 nuclear fuel elements was under numerous aimed artillery fire and got significant damages.

Since the beginning of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, cruise missile flights have been repeatedly recorded in the airspace over some Ukrainian nuclear power plants, where flights are prohibited. Information about such cases came from KhNPP, SUNPP and this morning from ZNPP.

The Russian federation may intentionally use no-fly zones over nuclear power plants to program cruise missile routes to prevent them from being hit by Ukraine's air defense forces, or to carry out an act of nuclear terrorism by provoking Ukrainian air defense forces and destroying missiles near or over a nuclear facility, which can lead to damage to vital technological elements of nuclear power plants, unacceptable radiological consequences and radiation pollution of large areas.

In order to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and the emergence of global emergencies, we appeal to the IAEA to apply measures of possible preventive influence on the aggressor country.

The military aggression of Russian federation against Ukraine includes deliberate military actions towards the Ukrainian nuclear installations, including:

- occupation nuclear facilities, their sites and controlled territories;
- murder and capture of security guards of NPPs;
- aggressive pressure and threats to the NPP operational staff,
- occupation of the NPPs’ satellite towns, threats and pressure on the families members of NPP staff (which is still ongoing right now in Energodar city);
- destruction by weapons or disabling of nuclear installations, auxiliary buildings, safety related equipment and radiation monitoring systems;
- unauthorized presence at Ukrainian nuclear facilities of country aggressor’s representatives from Russian nuclear utilities such as Rosatom;
- stealing of the safety related equipment, technical means, hardware, vehicles, personal protective equipment, etc.;
- broken logistical chains for staff rotation and supply of equipment, spares, materials, medicals etc. necessary for operation and maintenance of nuclear installations;
- damage of the electric power transmission lines and communication channels;

- dramatically increase the emergency occurrence in the situation when the adequate emergency response is impossible due to the damaged infrastructure and limitation of access of the emergency staff;
- place heavy military equipment and weapons on the nuclear sites and turn over nuclear sites into the military base.

The list is not exhausted but **the conclusion is clear: russian federation ignoring internationally recognized principles and requirements of nuclear and radiation safety and security commits Nuclear Terrorism Unfortunately this is committing under the IAEA connivance.**

Military seizure and destruction of nuclear installations has nothing to do with the assurance of the internationally recognized fundamental safety principles and requirements.

That is why since the beginning of this cynical brutal invasion of russian aggressor to Ukraine, we have looked for, relied on and applied for the efficient support from our international partners – IAEA, EBRD, European Commission, United Nations, OSCE, NATO, G-7 initiative members, ENSREG, WENRA etc.

Although we receive a lot of proposals for the technical, equipment, expert assistance from the IAEA and other international partners – we still do not have efficient instruments for the major safety priorities achievements for the nuclear installations in Ukraine, as follows:.

- to establish and coordinate a security zone around every Ukrainian NPP, where there should not be any military personnel, armaments or equipment;
- to demand that the representatives of the russian rosatom entity at the occupied ZNPP shall immediately leave the respective sites and hand over operational control over such sites to the Ukrainian officials;
- to assist in securing a rotation and delivery of the Ukrainian operating and maintenance staff at the occupied and been occupied nuclear installations;
- to ensure that any national of the russian federation or the republic of belarus, including as an employee of the IAEA, shall not take any part in the decision-making, preparation or conduct of any IAEA or other international missions or services to Ukraine.

We shall admit that there is no experience in the World of safe operation of nuclear installation in the context of large-scale war and recovery in the postwar period of the installations been effected by military actions in different scale.

As well as there is no experience of nuclear regulation in the context of large-scale war and in the postwar period.

So that the further wide and comprehensive cooperation with the IAEA and other international partners on safety and security of nuclear installations in Ukraine is of utmost importance for us as competent Ukrainian Authorities in a field of nuclear energy use and safety.

Due to the impossibility to independently and objectively carry out state oversight directly at the ZNPP site seized by the Russian Federation, the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Safety Inspectorate was put on hold, and the duties of the Head of Nuclear Safety Inspectorate at Zaporizhzhya NPP are temporarily assigned to Director of the Department for Nuclear Installation Safety Issues located in Kyiv office.

The military occupation of Exclusion Zone and military actions on this territory has made impossible safe activities in the Exclusion Zone (probability of mining, no safe transport links, destroyed / damaged bridges, roads).

It leads to:

- due to the impossibility safely carry out state oversight directly at the ChNPP site and on the Exclusion Zone territory Chornobyl Nuclear and Radiation Safety Inspectorate currently is not able to fulfill its supervision activity in a full scale according to the legislation;

- the ChNPP and State Specialized Enterprise "Centralized Radioactive Waste Management Enterprise SSE" can not ensure the full implementation of the functions provided by the rules and the regulatory requirements on nuclear and radiation safety, physical protection, as well as the conditions specified in the licenses issued by the SNRIU

This is mainly because of:

- the logistical routes for the delivery of staff to the facilities in the Exclusion Zone and equipment and materials necessary the safe operation and maintenance of the facilities have been disrupted;

- inability of the licensees to ensure the availability of the necessary number of qualified personnel to ensure the level of safety of decommissioning activity at ChNPP and radioactive waste management facilities, including New Safe Confinement, provided by the rules and the regulatory requirements on nuclear and radiation safety, physical protection, and licenses conditions;

- inability of the licensees to fully provide radiation dosimetric control, environmental monitoring and individual dosimetric control of personnel during licensed activities (equipment were destroyed and/or stolen by russian military forces).

Taking into account the situation arising from russian military occupation of the ChEZ and the consequences of the military invasion of the ChEZ, the SNRIU (in accordance with the legislation (the Law of Ukraine “Authorizing Activity in Nuclear Energy”) takes measures to suspend the licensed activities of operation of facilities, due to the inability of the licensees (in circumstances beyond their control) to fully comply the rules and the regulatory requirements on nuclear and radiation safety, physical protection, and license conditions.

### **Coordination of the supply of technical and humanitarian assistance in cooperation with the IAEA.**

Following the meeting of the IAEA Director General Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi and the heads of the SNRIU, the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine and Energoatom on the 30 March 2022 a number of agreements set out in the joint document "Assistance to Ukraine in nuclear and radiation safety, nuclear security and guarantees" have been adopted. As part of this initiative, the SNRIU developed proposals from the State Emergency Service (SES) and state-owned enterprises of Ukraine on the provision of equipment and spare parts for nuclear installations, radwaste management facilities, radiation sources facilities for their control, inspection and restoration of safe operation and sent to the IAEA consolidated list for humanitarian aid.

As a first step the request of the SES of Ukraine under the Convention on Assistance under a Nuclear Accident regarding the priority needs of individual protection of personnel was posted on the USIE IAEA website on 13 April 2022.

A positive example today are the actions of the U.S. DOE/NNSA to provide humanitarian assistance to Ukraine such as mobile measuring systems and other radiological monitoring equipment in exchange for lost and destroyed equipment during the occupation of the Exclusion Zone in the framework of bilateral cooperation.

Based on the decision of the Acting SNRIU Chairman, this equipment was promptly transferred to SSE “Ecocenter” for its intended use, namely: to meet the urgent need to control the non-proliferation of radiation substances beyond the Exclusion Zone.

Since the situation is constantly changing, the list of equipment for Ukraine formed based on the IAEA proposal cannot be considered as “complete”. It can only serve as a basis for coordinated actions and prioritization of equipment supplies according to preparedness and response needs, to replace lost or damaged equipment, according to other jointly defined safety maintaining objectives.