On December 14, 2023, the Media Center Ukraine – Ukrinform hosted a briefing by Acting SNRIU Chairman, Chief State Inspector for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Ukraine Oleh Korikov, at which he informed about the main achievements and challenges of 2023 in the field of nuclear and radiation safety.

At the beginning of the briefing, Oleh Korikov recalled that December 14 is the Day of the liquidator of the Chornobyl disaster, it was on this day 37 years ago that the construction was completed and the Shelter Structure was commissioned above Chernobyl reactor unit № 4.

“Today we honor the memory of all those who participated in the liquidation of the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, in the design and construction of the sarcophagus. We all have to remember what great sacrifices and extraordinary efforts the Chornobyl disaster was localized, and together with international partners we must prevent a new man-made disaster at any cost”, the head of the SNRIU noted.

Oleh Korikov began with achievements of 2023 in the field of nuclear energy use and ensured nuclear and radiation safety. In particular, among the positive results of 2023, he noted:

• 79 countries supported Ukraine and elected it as a member of the IAEA Board of Governors - the Agency's policy-making body. 2 years, Ukraine will have the opportunity to strengthen its influence on international policy in the field of security of the use of nuclear energy and non-proliferation of nuclear materials.
• Long-term operation of reactor unit №1 of the South Ukrainian NPP was continued. The SNRIU has amended the license, which allows to operate a 1000 MW reactor unit №1 until December 2, 2033.
• The " Regulation on Pre-License Assessment of the Nuclear Installation Project " was developed and approved. Therefore, SNRIU will be able to conduct a pre-license assessment of projects of new nuclear facilities at the request of interested parties: operating organizations, project organizations, suppliers of nuclear facilities. The purpose of the pre-license assessment is to identify potential problematic issues regarding the project of nuclear installations and to identify those technological solutions that can significantly complicate or make it impossible to obtain a license for the construction of nuclear installations in the future in advance.
• In 2023, Central Spent Fuel Storage Facility (CSFSF) started trial operation at the site of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. The operating organization has already worked out transport and technological operations for the management of spent nuclear fuel using modified technology at NPP reactor units and routes along which spent nuclear fuel is delivered from Rivne, Khmelnitsky, South Ukrainian NPP to CSFSF. After successful trial operation and carrying out the necessary safety analyses, the operating organization will be able to submit the application to SNRIU for a license for commercial operation.
• The trial operation of the American Westinghouse nuclear fuel at the WWER-440 unit of the Rivne NPP has begun. This is a significant progress towards the destruction of the monopoly of the russian federation on the supply of nuclear fuel for the design units of the former USSR. Ukraine is an example for European partners how to safely get rid of dependence on russian nuclear fuel.
• In 2023, on the initiative of Ukraine, the work of the IAEA permanent monitoring missions was launched at all Ukrainian nuclear power plants located in the territory controlled by Ukraine (in the occupied Zaporizhzhya NPP, the IAEA permanent monitoring mission has been operating since September 2022). The main task of the missions is to monitor the safety of existing nuclear power plants and the Chornobyl exclusion zone, analyze the effects of war, study the needs of enterprises and formulate proposals for providing the necessary technical assistance to the international nuclear community.

“Despite a number of positive results, the main topic and the main problem of the outgoing year remains the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant occupied by russian invaders, the state of nuclear and radiation safety of which continues to degrade”, the Acting SNRIU Chairman noted.

He identified the main factors and events of 2023 that create the biggest risks and threats to nuclear and radiation safety at ZNPP:

• Incompetent personnel who manage the nuclear installation, illegal management who gives appropriate orders, personnel of the unit control panel who do not have the appropriate qualifications and experience. This factor is also reflected in the IAEA reports.
• The destruction of the Kakhovka reservoir by the invaders, as a result of which ZNPP lost a reliable source of water supply necessary to feed the technological circuits to dissipate thermal energy, which continues to be produced in nuclear fuel.
• Increased level of ZNPP militarization. Technological premises continue to be used as shelters for weapons, explosives, military equipment. The occupiers restrict the IAEA from accessing these premises. In addition, IAEA experts recorded the facts of the invaders' shelling from artillery and MLRS from the territory in close proximity to ZNPP.
• Since May, the invaders have blocked the automatic transmission of data through an automated system for monitoring the radiation situation at ZNPP. As a result, Ukraine cannot fulfill its obligations to carry out early notification of possible incidents.
• Permanent de-energizing of Zaporizhzhya NPP, lack of stable power supply from the Ukrainian power system. Of the four 750 kV power lines that functioned before the war, only one remained in operation. Also, the 330 kV backup power line was recently lost, its restoration is currently impossible due to constant shelling by the russian invaders.
• As a result of irresponsible and incompetent actions of the occupation administration and unskilled personnel, in 2023, the barrier to the spread of radioactivity into the environment was twice destroyed (twice there was a leak of potentially radioactive water of the primary coolant into the secondary circuit). It also shows that equipment, safety systems and safety-critical systems are not being properly maintained or repaired.

As a result, Oleh Korikov stressed that the only option to return safety to Zaporizhzhya NPP is complete demilitarization and de-occupation of the plant, returning it under the control of the legitimate and competent operator Energoatom and under the control of the nuclear and radiation safety regulatory body of Ukraine - the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine.